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Abstract
The nature of how we make judgments has received a great deal of attention in the last
few decades. Risk communication research has indicated that risk-related messages can
elicit affective responses in audiences, which can then have a significant impact on how
such audiences judge risk in general. Using a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design, this
study found that, contrary to Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) findings, presenting
narratives about lethal risk does not influence readers’ judgments about the frequency
that risks occur, nor do such narratives influence participant worry levels about the lethal
risks, more generally. Additionally, the inclusion of an image alongside both positively
and negatively valenced narratives demonstrated no effect on frequency estimates or
worry levels. These experimental conditions, although revealing no significant effects,
did illuminate the relationship between judgments of risk frequency and corresponding
worry levels. Implications for future research on affect and judgments of risk, as well as
the relationship between judgments of control and risk assessments, are discussed.
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Chapter One: Introduction
It should come as no surprise that humans are prone to errors in judgment.
Because we are often limited in the information to which we have access, we frequently
rely on either incomplete evidence, emotional cues, or both when assessing the world we
inhabit. Such errors are particularly powerful in terms of how humans judge risk. While
certainly capable of applying logic to potentially risky situations and behaving
accordingly, our states of mind and the manner in which messages of risk are presented
often short-circuit logic and lead us to over or underestimate risk. These imperfections of
cognition are commonplace and are often no cause for concern. In some instances,
however, such cognitive failures compel actors to pursue unwarranted actions—actions
which may have been resisted had a risk been properly assessed.
Recurring examples of such errors in judgment are demonstrated in public polling
data. For example, public opinion surveys demonstrate that Americans tend to believe
that violent crime rates are rising even though official data suggest the opposite. “These
polling trends stand in sharp contrast to the long-term crime trends reported by the FBI
and BJS [Bureau of Justice Statistics]. Both agencies have documented big decreases in
violent and property crime rates since the early 1990s, when U.S. crime rates reached
their peak” (Gramlich, 2016, para 10). In the same vein, the citizenry overestimates the
danger posed by terrorist attacks in the United States in comparison with a seemingly
endless list of other, more frequently occurring mortal dangers. For example, Politifact
(2015) noted that, between 2005 and 2015, extremist attacks claimed the lives of 71
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Americans. During that same period, gun deaths accounted for over 300,000 deaths. This
incongruence between the degrees of risk among several risk categories is important
The effort to gain a fuller understanding of how humans make errors when
judging risk is not simply an academic exercise. The better we understand how and why
such errors occur, the more likely we are to develop effective strategies for steering the
broader public toward reasonable assessments of the level of risk carried by a multitude
of potential hazards. In discussing the impact that acts of terrorism have on the public’s
judgment of risk, Cass Sunstein (1980) writes:
Hence an act of terrorism will have a large number of “ripple effects” […]
including a demand for legal interventions that might not reduce risks and that
might in fact make things worse. Consider, for example, the possibility that
extensive security precautions at airports will lead people to drive rather than to
fly; because flying is much safer than driving, such precautions might sacrifice
many lives on balance. (p. 2)
In other words, managing our collective judgment of risk is important on a practical level.
Unwarranted fears about low-probability events can have a negative practical impact. So,
too, can the underestimation of such events create a collective apathy towards
preparedness and a rejection of reasonable policies designed to mitigate potential harm.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how affect influences judgments of risk and the
degree to which varying message features play a role in guiding such judgments.
In chapter 2, this study will present a review of literature to provide a foundation
for influential elements in how we judge risk. Chapter 3 will detail the methods used in
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the effort to properly measure the constructs, as well as the participants who have taken
part in the study. Chapter 4 will report the results of the study, which indicated that affect
had no impact on participants’ worry levels or frequency estimates. Finally, chapter 5
will use these results as a way of broadening the discussion concerning implications for
research on affect and judgments of risk, limitations of the methodology used, and how
this research can be extended in future studies.

4

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Judgments of Risk
The term risk has been conceptualized in several different ways, largely
dependent upon the domain in which risk is being studied. As it will be referred to in this
study, the term risk simply refers to the uncertainty of outcomes or the extent to which
outcomes are more or less probable (Folkes, 1988; Harrington & Kerr, 2017; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980; Starr, 1969;). Risk researchers, particularly those who
operate in the domains of psychology (Arrow, 1982; Lopes, 1987; Rottenstreich & Hsee,
2001), decision-making (Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2008; Lu, Hsu, & Hsu, 2005), and
communication (Coleman, 1993; Harrington & Kerr, 2017; Wray, Kreuter, Jacobsen,
Clements, & Evans, 2004), approach risk analysis from a different perspective than those
who operate in finance, for example. Rather than focusing on mathematical probabilities,
those who work in social or psychological fields address the subjective nature of risk.
The estimated severity or frequency of a given hazard will vary between subjects and
tends to vary depending upon those subjects’ affective states (Lichtenstein, Slovic,
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). Researchers in sociology and psychology recognize
that such fundamental subjectivity requires a research approach which extends beyond
mathematical probabilities.
It is important to first understand how research has integrated cognitive heuristics
into explorations regarding judgments of risk. The term heuristics refers to the mental
shortcuts that individuals use when making cognitively complex assessments (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1975). Before heuristics were given due credit for their influence on
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judgments of risk, a considerable volume of scholarship asserted that humans rely
primarily on rational evaluations and logic when assessing the potential costs and benefits
of a given course of action (Fishburn, 1970; Mossin, 1968; Pratt, 1964). Judgments of
risk were once considered a function of primarily logical, deliberative thought processes.
That perspective is most synonymous with expected utility theory (EUT), which
postulates that decision-making and risk assessment are based on a deliberative
comparison between potential costs or benefits of a given action (Mongin, 1997).
Expected utility theory research has traditionally examined risk through a financial lens.
Such calculations have been considered by some, however, to be inadequate
descriptions of the process by which humans evaluate risk under uncertainty. As Paul
Slovic puts it, “Reliance on ‘the feeling of risk’ was essential to human survival in the
course of evolution, and even today, feelings serve as a compass that guides most of our
daily decisions” (Slovic, 2016, p. 29). To his point, imagine walking through grass, and
your eye catches something that appears to “slither” near your feet. The natural reaction
is something that most anyone in this situation would have—to jump back. This reaction
is not the result of judiciously considering the snake population in the area and the
probability of it being a poisonous or aggressive variety of snake. It is an instant reaction
and one that supersedes deliberative information processing. What this example suggests
is that human cognition has an evolutionary, purely visceral component. Human
cognition, however, does not live only in a world of instinct. We can deliberate over the
decisions we make and often do, provided that we have the time and all necessary
information. But we employ both of these systems often simultaneously by using
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cognitive shortcuts in order to make assessments quickly without exerting too much
cognitive effort (Kahneman, 2011).
The distinction between judgment and perception is not a simple one to convey.
Risk communication researchers routinely use the terms interchangeably ( Lichtenstein,
et al., 1978; Slovic, 2016), although some have argued that the two are not synonymous,
arguing that perception is a sensory precursor to judgment (Coleman, 1993; Dunwoody &
Neuwirth, 1991). Firestone and Scholl (2015) suggest that sensory cues are first
processed and then judgments can be made according to those sensory inputs. Firestone
and Scholl (2015) argue, for example, that “whereas we can directly see visual properties
such as the color or size of a banana, we can only infer, conclude, or judge that the
banana is expensive or is grown in South America” (p. 1217). This study is aimed at
capturing the second piece of the above example—the inferences and judgments—and
will therefore refer to judgments of risk accordingly.
Cognitive Heuristics
In the mid-1950s, Herbert Simon (1992) proposed that, because there are
constraints on humans’ ability to consider every piece of relevant information when
making a decision or assessment, we rely on cues to inform our intuition. In expanding
on that notion, he wrote the following:
In everyday speech, we use the word intuition to describe a problem-solving or
question-answering performance that is speedy and for which the expert is unable
to describe in detail the reasoning or other process that produced the answer. The
situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to information
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stored in memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing
more and nothing less than recognition. (p. 155)
When confronted with a risk or a situation that demands a decision be made, the
impossibility of having all pertinent information forces a person to rely on heuristics.
Reliance on heuristics is a necessary shorthand that, although often useful, leaves us
susceptible to errors in judgment.
Extant research specifically suggests that the influence of two cognitive
heuristics—affect and availability—are particularly influential in how we judge risk
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Kahneman, 2011; Slovic, 2016; Slovic,
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975).
The availability heuristic. The availability heuristic refers to the ease with which
a person can recall instances of an occurrence or a class of occurrences (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973). In terms of probability assessments, the strength of the associative
bond between a potential external event and the ease with which a person can retrieve an
example of a similar event has been found to influence the frequency that a person
estimates such events occur generally (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, pp. 208–209).
Experiments on matters as wide-ranging as participants’ judgments of their own level of
assertiveness (Schwarz et al., 1991), the frequency with which particular letters of the
alphabet appear in the first position in a word versus the third position (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973), and investor predictions about future earnings (Moser, 1989) suggest
that this heuristic is routinely employed in the process of making predictive judgments.
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Considerable research supports the validity of this heuristic. For example, when
asked to judge the frequency of pairs of lethal events (e.g., strokes vs. accidents,
tornadoes vs. asthma, lightning vs. botulism), Lichtenstein et al. (1978) found that
respondents consistently estimated the less frequent events to occur more frequently than
the event with which it was paired. Asthma causes approximately 20 times the number of
deaths than tornadoes, yet participants judged tornadoes to be a more frequent cause of
death (1978, p. 555). The authors assert that conjuring an image of a tornado is much
easier than recalling an “image” of asthma and, therefore, participants overestimated
tornado-related fatalities. In other words, tornadoes are more readily available in one’s
memory than are asthma attacks.
In another study, Keller, Siegrist, and Gutscher (2006) found that, when presented
with statistical probabilities of floods, participants who had personally experienced a
flood judged flood risks as greater than those who had not. “Persons who stored images
or narratives about floods in their memories”, the authors write, “perceived the same
probability information differently from people without such memories” (p. 636).
Sherman et al. (1985) found particularly illuminating results in their study of how
imagination relates to availability. The researchers asked one group of participants (group
A) to imagine a set of symptoms that could easily be envisioned (e.g., headaches, muscle
aches) and were told that they are indicative of a disease called “Hyposcenia-B.” A
second group (group B) was instructed to imagine a set of symptoms that would be more
difficult to envision (e.g., liver inflammation, disorientation). The results of the
experiment revealed that members of group A rated their chances of contracting
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“Hyposcenia-B” significantly higher than those in group B (Sherman et al., 1985, p. 123),
suggesting that the ease or difficulty of imagining symptoms also impacts judgments of
probability.
Ease of retrieval is not only a product of first-hand experience, however.
Exposure to mediated narratives or being asked to imagine negative outcomes have also
been found to impact individuals’ assessments of risk. For example, if a particular cause
of death is reported more often than a different, yet equally frequent cause of death,
consumers of that source of information will, sometimes drastically, misjudge the
frequency of the two causes relative to one another (Combs & Slovic, 1979). The manner
in which stories are reported and the frequency with which particular classes of stories
are reported (e.g., natural disasters, crime, corruption) have an impact on readers’
judgments of frequency. The “how” and the “how often” with regard to news reporting
influences both affect and availability.
As Tversky and Kahneman (1975) describe it, “In general, availability is a useful
clue for assessing frequency or probability, because instances of large classes are recalled
better and faster than instances of less frequent classes” (p. 15). Most importantly, the
easier it is to recall a class or category of events, the more likely an individual is to
overestimate the frequency of such events (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975, p. 15).
The affect heuristic. The affect heuristic refers to responses to stimuli based on
affective cues; affect can be described as what scholar Paul Slovic (2004) calls, “a ‘faint
whisper of emotion’” (p. 312). In other words, the way that we feel about a stimulus—the
“goodness” or “badness” of that feeling—informs our judgment of that stimulus.
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Although previous research has tended to use affect, mood, feelings, and emotion
interchangeably (Kahneman, 2011; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Wright & Bower, 1992), some
have argued that these terms, specifically emotion and affect, are distinct and should be
treated as such (Massumi, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
The difficulty in sufficiently defining affect is evidenced by Slovic (2004)
himself. Even after describing affect as a “faint whisper of emotion”, he goes on to use
emotion and affect interchangeably in the same article, effectively dispensing with the
“faint whisper” portion of his own definition. Those scholars who assert that these terms
should not be considered synonymous (Massumi, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) suggest
that emotion is a more nuanced term than affect and is not simply a binary—positive or
negative—state. Schwarz and Clore (2007) argue that, “All emotions are affective, but
not all affective things are emotions” (p. 385). They assert that emotions, unlike affective
states, have clearly identifiable referents or causes. In other words, if a person is angry,
that person can likely identify the source of that anger—they are angry at something. If
that person is experiencing a negative affective state, they are in a bad mood (p. 386).
One particular emotion that is most applicable to this study is worry. Worry has
been identified as a key contributor to how risk is assessed and one’s perception of risk
controllability (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). Though it could
reasonably be described as either a dimension or contributor to affective states
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998), worry is an essential indicator of how we assess
uncertainties such as disaster, disease, and unforeseeable accidents. Research has
suggested that risk probability judgments are positively associated with both worry levels
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and desire for action that would mitigate various risks (Baron, Hershey, & Kunreuther,
2000).
While this contention—that affect and specific emotions such as worry should be
considered separate concepts—is not without merit, decades of researchers have used the
terms interchangeably. Given that, this study will also treat emotion and affect as
synonymous concepts.
For many years, affect was neglected in explanatory models of risk judgments.
Zajonc (1980), one of the first to recognize the key role that affect plays in decision
making and cognition, more generally, wrote the following:
We may completely fail to notice a person's hair color or may hardly remember
what it was shortly after meeting the person. But we can seldom escape the
reaction that the person impressed us as pleasant or unpleasant, agreeable or
disagreeable, as someone to whom we were drawn or someone by whom we were
repelled. (p. 6)
Although Zajonc, in this passage, is referring to an interpersonal encounter, the salience
of affect holds true in nearly every assessment humans make. We attach a positive or
negative valence—consciously or unconsciously—to the events and situations we
encounter.
Narrative impact. The impact of narrative exposure has received a fair amount
of study as it relates to judgments of risk. In 1983, Tversky and Johnson conducted an
experiment that explored such impacts. Importantly, they noted that, “One characteristic
that distinguishes judgments about risks from other estimates…is that they seldom occur
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in an emotionally neutral context” (pp. 20-21). The authors theorized that a person’s
affective response to a risk-related narrative would influence his or her judgment of that
risk. They proposed that the affective response elicited by a story about a specific hazard
may inflate a reader’s estimate for the prevalence of that hazard. Their experiment,
therefore, sought to better understand the connection between a person’s frequency
estimates of specific risks and his or her exposure to detailed descriptions of an
individual’s death due to a cause related to one of the risks. “Like many newspaper
stories,” the authors wrote, “our accounts described details of the tragic incident, but gave
no information about its prevalence” (1983, p. 3). They predicted that exposure to such
accounts would increase both the subjects’ level of worry about the specific hazard
detailed in the account as well as the subjects’ estimation of its frequency relative to the
control condition. As they put it, they thought that the stories would produce a local
effect. In other words, estimates related to the hazard described—as well as closelyrelated hazards—would be higher for the experimental condition than for the control
condition, they predicted. To their surprise the experimental condition produced a global
effect, meaning that experimental subjects reported higher rates of worry and frequency
estimates even for unrelated risks noted in the questionnaire than did those in the control
condition. The participants’ affective response resulted in a generalized impact on their
assessments of lethal risks—from leukemia to lightning strikes to terrorism (the
questionnaire included a total of eighteen risk items). What the authors concluded from
these results is that the mood induced by the detailed narrative had a global effect on
respondents’ frequency estimates (Johnson & Tversky, 1983, p. 29). “Risks that are
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closely linked to the story should be influenced more than unrelated risks,” they noted,
“contrary to the present findings” (p. 30).
The results imply that, even though these tragic accounts were included in a set of
three (fictional) newspaper articles, the narrative impact of the tragedy described was
sufficient to influence the affective disposition of the respondents. In other words, the
narrative description of a tragic event resulted in a negative affective response toward the
cause of the tragedy, which carried over to other risks, regardless of their relationship to
the specific risk described in the story—the “target risk”, as they described it. Johnson
and Tversky (1983) suggest that, “The results give rise to the hypothesis that we tend to
make judgments that are compatible with our current mood, even when the subject matter
is unrelated to the cause of that mood” (1983, p. 16).
Affect and availability are certainly not independent of one another. It is
conceivable that availability is not simply influenced by the ease with which a class is
recalled or imagined. The affective component may very well “tag” those memories or
imaginings, making them more salient and increasing the strength of availability (Slovic
et al., 2004). For example, if one were exposed to a news item that detailed the symptoms
of a particularly deadly infectious disease, that story would likely result in a powerful
“imprint” on that person’s memory—in this case, a negative imprint. Subsequent
references to that disease would therefore more easily activate the affective dimension of
a memory, the reader’s affective response to the initial story. Slovic et al. (2004) refers to
the catalogue of such images in a person’s mind as their “affect pool”, with each image
“…tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect” (p. 314).
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Our tendency to disconnect our affective state from risk assessments, as described
by Johnson and Tversky (1983), is in line with Zajonc’s (1980) assertion that, “The
dismal failure in achieving substantial attitude change through various forms of
communication or persuasion is another indication that affect is fairly independent and
often impervious to cognition” (p. 158). This point was backed up by Johnson and
Tversky’s (1983) findings that worry levels and frequency estimates were unrelated to the
source of participants’ negative affective state. In accordance with the results of their
study, the following hypotheses are offered:
H1: Participants who are exposed to a narrative that describes a tragic outcome
due to a specific risk will report higher global worry levels than those exposed to
a narrative that describes a positive outcome.
H2: Participants’ who are exposed to a narrative that describes a tragic outcome
due to a specific risk will report higher global risk frequency estimates than those
exposed to a narrative that describes a positive outcome.
Image-based Messaging
The notion that affect can so substantially alter our judgments, while somewhat
troubling to those who wish to properly communicate risk, is evidenced in persuasive
tactics found in other domains of communication research. Persuasion research that has
informed advertising and marketing strategies takes full advantage of the influence of
viewer affect on message receptivity and, more specifically, the impact of imagery on
viewer affect. While advertising may seem a world apart from risk communication, their
practitioners each fundamentally seek to influence the attitudes of their audiences
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(O’keefe, 2002). While the advertiser appeals to the consumer in the interest of selling a
product, risk communicators appeal to their audience in the interest of correcting any
misperceptions an audience may have about a given risk. It is therefore important to
understand the influence that image presentation has on message receptivity in general, as
it is not a tool available only to those who are interested in a financial profit.
Attitudes and judgments. Several advertising effects studies have supported the
notion that images have a stronger influence on consumer attitudes and preferences than
do text-based messaging strategies (Edell & Burke, 1987; MacInnis & Price, 1987; Scott,
1994). What these findings imply is that images have a greater salience for message
receivers than do narrative descriptions. For example, Mitchell and Olson’s (1981) study
on how the content of an advertisement influences viewer attitudes found that the
inclusion of images had a significant effect on respondents’ beliefs about product
attributes, attitudes, and their intentions to purchase the product (p. 327).
More in line with judgments of risk, health communication scholars have noted
the influence of image-based messages in promoting or discouraging risky behaviors. In
their meta-analysis of health communication messaging, Houts et al. (2006) found that
adding images to text-based messages “can increase patient attention, comprehension,
recall and adherence” (p. 187). It is unclear, however, if the persuasive power of the
image has a similar impact with regard to risk assessments. If imagery is more effective
in inducing attitude changes than text-based narratives, whether they are related to the
attractiveness of a product or one’s propensity to engage in dangerous behaviors, it can
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reasonably be assumed that images should also prove a more powerful influence over risk
assessments.
If the ease with which a hazardous image is conjured influences how we judge
that hazard, it may well follow that overtly providing that image has a similar effect.
Because the hazardous image is provided, exposure to it effectively activates the
availability heuristic and, consequently, the affect heuristic. It would then follow, based
on Tversky and Johnson’s (1983) findings, that participants would estimate the hazard to
be more prevalent than those who had not been exposed to the image. Research regarding
this question, however, is limited and the effect of image inclusion in this context is not
fully understood. Because the current media landscape is heavily reliant on imagery, it is
important to gain a better understanding of how such imagery impacts judgments of risk.
Therefore, the following research questions are put forth:
RQ1a: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic narrative result in greater
local risk frequency estimates of message receivers than those who only are only
exposed to the narrative?
RQ1b: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic narrative result in greater
local worry levels of message receivers than those who only are only exposed to
the narrative?
RQ2a: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic narrative result in greater
global risk frequency estimates of message receivers than those who only are only
exposed to the narrative?
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RQ2b: Does exposure to an image alongside a tragic narrative result in greater
global worry levels of message receivers than those who only are only exposed to
the narrative?
It is certainly plausible that participants who are provided with an image will respond
similarly to those surveyed by Johnson and Tversky (1983)—the presence of a tragic
image may be no more impactful than a tragic narrative that they find easy to visualize. It
may, however, provide a clarity of a hazard that they cannot sufficiently picture in their
heads, resulting in a more pronounced impact on their affective response and, as a result,
their worry levels and frequency estimates for that particular hazard.
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Chapter Three: Methods
Overview
The experimental method employed in this study was designed, like Tversky and
Johnson’s (1983), to explore the degree to which affect influences judgments of risk. The
experimental conditions (detailed in the “Procedure” sub-section below) were designed to
elicit an affective response with regard to a specific risk while providing minimal data
related to its general prevalence. The affective response of participants could then be
recorded across all conditions and compared with participants’ frequency estimates
regarding a range of potential hazards. Like Tversky and Johnson (1983), this study
recorded participants’ worry levels and frequency estimates for a range of potentially
lethal hazards as a way of measuring their local and global judgments of risk (p. 21).
Worry level and frequency estimates served as the dependent variables for the hypotheses
and research questions.
The set of risks used in this study is identical to those used in Johnson and
Tversky’s (1983). They arrived at their set by first surveying an undergraduate
population, which identified 36 risks. The authors then narrowed the list to 18 by
factoring in those most frequently listed by the students along with those that are actually
the most common causes of death.
In order to determine similarity between various risks, Johnson and Tversky
(1983) conducted another survey of undergraduate students who were asked to rate the
similarity between risks on a 10 point scale. Using an additive tree algorithm (Sattath &
Tversky, 1977) the authors used the survey responses to construct a “tree” of similarity,
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in which the risks “…appear as terminal nodes of the tree, and the distance between
objects is the length of the horizontal part of the path that connects them” (Johnson &
Tversky, 1983, p. 21). The resulting tree is pictured in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Additive tree representation from Tversky and Johnson (1983, p. 22)
For Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study, the additive tree above served as the basis for
determining if reported worry levels and frequency estimates suggested a local or global
effect. The same list of hazards was used in this current study. Because the experimental
conditions in this study describe death due to a fire, an increase in worry levels and
frequency estimates for deaths by fire could be considered an indication of a local effect.
Any increase, relative to the control condition, in worry levels or frequency estimates for
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dissimilar hazards—those that fall outside of the “natural disaster” category (tornadoes,
floods, lightning, fire, and electrocution)—would suggest a generalized influence and
could then be considered an indication of a global effect.
Participants
Using Amazon Mechanical Turk, an advertisement was placed online to recruit
participants for this study. The recruitment took place on March 28th, 2018. The
advertisement solicited any participants 18 or over, who live in the United States, and
have a positive Mechanical Turk rating, which ensured that participants had established
themselves as reliable users of the service. Additionally, the population of interest was
U.S. residents over the age of 18 and the parameters of the recruitment reflected the
target population. After agreeing to an informed consent form that outlined any potential
risks associated with participation in the study, as well as confirming their ages to be at
least 18, participants were directed to the online study. All materials presented to
participants were approved by Portland State University’s Institutional Review Board
prior to distribution online.
Of the entire participant pool (N = 254) 18 participants (7.1%) were omitted from
the analysis due to incomplete responses (n = 1) or a failure to correctly answer the
attention check (n = 16). A single additional participant was excluded because he or she
estimated that over fifty percent of the U.S. population died in 2017. Of the remaining
235 participants, there were 132 males (56.2%) and 103 females (43.8%). Participants
who reported ethnicity self-identified as White/Caucasian (n = 186, 79.1%), Hispanic or
Latino (n = 16, 6.8%), Black or African American (n = 23, 9.8%), Asian/Pacific Islander
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(n = 16, 6.8%), and “Other” (n = 5, 2.1%). Participant ages ranged from 21 to 69 (M =
35.87, SD = 10.48).
Procedure
The study employed a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design to test the
hypotheses and research questions. The independent variables included were story type
(positive or tragic) and image inclusion (without image or with image); see table 1.
Table 1
2 x 2 experimental design
Image (IV)

Story

Positive

Type (IV)

Tragic

Without

With

Positive story without

Positive story with image

image (Condition one)

(Condition two)

Tragic story without

Tragic story with image

image (Condition three)

(Condition four)

In accordance with Johnson and Tversky’s design (1983, p. 23), the first part of the
questionnaire began with the following instructions: “A popular trend in journalism has
been the inclusion of personal interest and feature stories. Please carefully read the short
newspaper article on the following page and answer the questions that follow.” The
experimental stimulus was then presented to the participant.
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As a point of reference, the narratives which served as the experimental stimuli in
Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) original study were described in the following way:
All four groups were presented with two brief and mundane items, which were
two paragraphs long, modeled after "People in the News" columns in local papers.
The three experimental groups each received an additional story about the death
of a single person. The experimental stories that describe the fatal events
consisted of three paragraphs. The portrayal of the death was detailed, designed to
induce anxiety and worry. (p. 23)
The narratives used in the current study were adapted from an actual article in The
Oregonian newspaper’s online publication, OregonLive.com (Eastman, 2017). It
described a local resident who had recently won a remodeled home as a prize giveaway
from a popular television program. The positive tone of the article aligned with the
“People in the News” type of narrative provided to the control group in the original study
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983).
The positive condition (Condition 1) in this study consisted of a shortened version
of the article described above; it appeared underneath a headline that read “Local Man
Wins Big.” The title of the article was aimed at being both succinct and innocuous so as
to avoid any priming effects. For all conditions, the name of the prize winner was
changed from Magne Jensen to Steven McInnis. The name change was intended to
protect the actual identity of the subject of the piece. The location of the prize home was
changed from Knoxville, Tennessee to Ventura, California. The text of the positive
article read as follows:
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Good fortune struck Steven McInnis, a local man from Beaverton, Oregon, on
Sunday. More than 65 million people had entered HGTV's Urban Oasis
Giveaway. And luck hadn't shone much on McInnis in the past. Once, he won a
book from a local radio show. But all that changed when his name was drawn and
he won the contest's grand prize: A remodeled and furnished bungalow-style
house in Southern California, plus $50,000 cash.
The home and garden channel's 2017 giveaway was a twist on past pricey
drawings. This year, instead of a contemporary home, the winner received a
remodeled Craftsman-style house in an upscale neighborhood just outside of
Ventura, California. "I figured, what have I got to lose? You never know,"
McInnis told HGTV. When he first heard he was going to receive a house, he
couldn’t believe it. "I've never won anything like this in my life," he said.
McInnis, his wife, and son plan to move into their new home in April.
The positive condition that included an image (Condition 2) consisted of an identical
story and headline alongside an image (see Figure 1) of the home won by the subject of
the story. The image was chosen to align with its
description—a furnished, bungalow-style
home—and was borrowed from a website of a
company that specializes in selling custom home
plans for bungalow-style homes (“Bungalow
House Plans,” n.d.). The negative condition

Figure2: Condition 2 image
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(Condition 3) was also adapted from the original The Oregonian article, although it
described the subject as having died in a California wildfire while moving into the new
home. The location change previously mentioned was included to increase the
plausibility of the tragic account. The headline of the story read “Local Man Dies in
Wildfire.” The title of the article was also aimed at being both succinct and innocuous so
as to avoid any priming effects. The text of the tragic article read as follows:
Tragedy struck on Sunday, as Beaverton, Oregon resident Steven McInnis lost his
life to the wildfires raging in Southern California. As readers may remember,
McInnis was a recent winner of HGTV’s Urban Oasis Giveaway. The prize for
the contest was a remodeled Craftsman-style house in an upscale neighborhood
just outside of Ventura, California, along with $50,000 cash. He was in the
process of moving into his new home when high winds pushed the fire into his
neighborhood overnight, destroying several homes. Late Monday evening,
search and rescue officials confirmed that McInnis did not survive the blaze.
Another resident of the neighborhood described the area as looking “like a war
zone”. “The fire moved so quickly into our neighborhood,” she said, “that my son
and I were lucky to escape. I don’t think that anyone realized just how quickly it
could overtake our homes. It’s just such a tragedy” McInnis is survived by his
wife and their ten year-old son.

25

The negative condition that included an image (Condition 4) was structured in much the
same way as condition two. The negative story appeared alongside an image of a burning
house (Warburg, 2018). The image was borrowed from a Santa Barbara-based news site
(see Figure 4). It appeared in an article about pending lawsuits over the Thomas Fire, a
California wildfire that burned over 280,000 acres
in Southern California from December, 2017 to
January, 2018. All conditions were presented in
the form of newspaper mock-ups from a fictional
newspaper called The Beaverton Times. A fictional

Figure 3: Tragic narrative

publication was used in order to avoid activating pre-existing perceptions of source
credibility. The masthead of the newspaper was identical for all four conditions. The
articles in the positive conditions (1 and 2) contained 163 words. The articles in the
negative conditions (3 and 4) contained 159 words. The format (font type, image
size/position, story position) was matched between conditions.
It should be noted that these conditions were not presented as gain or loss frames;
instead, the positive and tragic stories described vastly different outcomes for the subject
of the article Participants completed the experiment through Qualtrics, an online survey
platform. Each was presented with one of the four conditions. The assignment of the
conditions was randomly generated by Qualtrics. The texts and images for all conditions
are included in Appendix A.
Participants completed the experiment through Qualtrics, an online survey
platform. Each was presented with one of the four conditions. The assignment of the
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conditions was randomly generated by Qualtrics and evenly distributed among the
participants.
Measures
Worry level. In accordance with Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study, worry
level was measured using a single item. Participants were asked to rate their level of
worry from 1 to 10 for each of the 18 risks (see Figure 1; see Appendix B) used in the
original study, with 1 = not worried at all and 10 = extremely worried. The order of the
risks was automatically randomized through Qualtrics.
Local worry levels were measured by participants’ responses to the target risk
included in the tragically valenced narrative—fire. Global worry levels were measured by
responses to all risks that did not fall into the natural disaster category—accidental falls,
traffic accidents, airplane accidents, homicide, terrorism, war, nuclear accidents, toxic
chemical spills, stroke, heart disease, leukemia, stomach cancer, and lung cancer (see
Figure 1). The mean worry level for these risks combined comprised participants’ global
worry level.
Frequency estimates. Frequency estimates were also based on the measures used
by Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study. Estimates were measured in a similarly simple
manner—participants were simply asked to estimate the annual number of fatalities in the
U.S. for each of the risks provided. As a way of providing a common anchor to all
respondents, participants were first told that approximately 37,000 Americans died in
automobile accidents in 2017 (Highway Deaths Lead National Increase in Transportation
Fatalities,” n.d.). They were then asked to estimate annual fatality totals for the remaining
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17 risks. The order of the risks was automatically randomized through Qualtrics. As with
measurements of worry level, proximity to the target risk (fire) was used to determine
which risks were categorized as local or global.
Additional measures. All participants were asked after reading the article to rate
clarity, style, interest, informativeness, overall quality of writing, and source credibility
on a 10 point Likert-type scale. These items served as distractors. Additionally, questions
regarding participants’ experiences with and attitudes about good fortune were included
as distractors to the items that measured participant judgments of lethal events. The
questions regarding good fortune served to further disguise the hypotheses and research
questions of the study. By disguising the aim of the survey, the distractors mitigate the
risk of priming participants and influencing their responses.
Participants were then each asked to answer a single item, 10 point mood question
which asked how they would feel if they had read a similar story in a local newspaper.
Response options ranged from “Negative, Depressed” to “Positive, Uplifted”. This item
served as a manipulation check and was identical to the check used in the original study
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983, p.23).
The final set of survey questions recorded demographic data from the participants
including, age, gender, and ethnicity.
Analysis
To ensure valid results, respondents who did not finish the survey or failed the
attention check were excluded from the final analysis (n = 19). As participants’
frequency estimates produced a number of extreme outliers, those estimates were
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winsorized, which is an accepted method of accounting for univariate outliers (Keselman,
Algina, Lix, Wilcox, & Deering, 2008). Winsorizing univariate outliers simply means
that “all scores whose z score equivalent is 3.0 or greater are trimmed to whatever score
corresponds to a z score of 3.0” (Pelham, 2012, p. 371).
Both hypotheses were analyzed using independent samples t tests and all research
questions were analyzed using 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA testing. Missing cases
were excluded pairwise rather than listwise, so that participants’ responses were not
completely excluded due to an unanswered question. Additionally, because participants’
local and global frequency estimates were skewed, chi-square tests were also conducted
as sensitivity checks. Significance level for all analysis was set a priori at .05.
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Chapter Four: Results
Participant responses to a 10-point mood scale served as a manipulation check.
Those who were exposed to a story with a positive valence (n = 116) reported
significantly more positive responses (M = 7.7, SD = 1.8) than did those who were
exposed to a tragic story (n = 119, M =3.2, SD = 2, t(233) = 18, p < .001). The
manipulation check was therefore successful.
Overall, participants’ responses to frequency estimates were highly inconsistent.
Across all conditions, global estimate means (the overall mean for all risks outside of the
natural disaster category) had a range of just under 470,000 and a standard deviation of
over 63,000. The response range for local frequency estimates (the mean for fire
fatalities) was over 180,000, with a standard deviation of over 22,000. Mean worry levels
ranged from lows of 2.60 (SD = 2.35) and 2.70 (SD = 2.58) for toxic chemical spills and
nuclear accidents, respectively, to highs of 6.32 (SD = 2.77) and 6.47 (SD = 2.61) for
heart disease and traffic accidents, respectively.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants who were exposed to a narrative that
describes a tragic outcome (n = 55) due to a specific risk would report higher global
worry levels than those exposed to a narrative that describes a positive outcome (n = 54).
Replicating Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) study, neither condition used to test H1
included an image. A two-tailed independent samples t test was conducted on worry
levels for all global risks. The results indicated no statistically significant difference
between those exposed to a tragic narrative (M = 4.1, SD = 2.1) and those exposed to a
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positive narrative (M = 4.1, SD = 1.9, t(107) = -0.06, p = .95). Hypothesis 1 was therefore
unsupported.
Similarly, hypothesis 2 predicted that participants exposed to a narrative that
describes a tragic outcome due to a specific risk would report higher global frequency
estimates than those exposed to a narrative that describes a positive outcome. A twotailed independent samples t test was conducted on mean estimates for all global risks.
Hypothesis 2 was unsupported as results indicated no statistically significant difference in
global frequency estimates between those who read a tragic story (M = 33,757, SD =
67,524) and those who read a positive story (M = 27,807, SD = 48,332, t(107) = -0.53, p
= .60).
To analyze the research questions, 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA testing was
conducted in order to determine if any effects were present according to story valence or
image inclusion as well as any interaction effects. Research question 1a examined if the
inclusion of an image alongside a tragic narrative would impact participants’ local
frequency estimates. The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant main effect for
image inclusion on participants’ local frequency estimates, F(1/231) = 2.03, p = .16.
Similarly, no significant effect was observed according to story valence, F(1/231) = 0.25,
p = .62. Finally, ANOVA testing indicated no significant interaction effect on
participants’ local frequency estimates, F(1/231) = 2.73, p = .10. In summary, local
frequency estimates were not significantly affected by either of the independent variables
(see Table 1).
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Research question 1b examined if the inclusion of an image alongside a tragic
narrative would impact participants’ local worry levels. The results of ANOVA testing
indicated no significant main effect for image inclusion on participants’ local worry
levels, F(1/231) = 0.00, p = .99. Similarly, no significant effect was observed according
to story valence, F(1/231) = 0.28, p = .60. Finally, ANOVA testing indicated no
significant interaction effect on participants’ local frequency estimates, F(1/231) = 0.20,
p = .66. Just as with local frequency estimates, participants’ local worry levels were not
significantly impacted by either of the independent variables.
Table 2
Local Frequency Estimates
Story Valence

N

M

SD

Without Image

54

8,202

24,688

With Image

62

8,860

15,768

116

7,158

28,698

Without Image

55

14,470

32,080

With Image

64

5,509

13,636

119

9,650

24,297

Positive

Total
Tragic

Total

Research questions 2a and 2b were concerned with global frequency estimates
and worry levels and, like RQ1a and RQ1b, whether image inclusion would impact
participant responses. For RQ2a, ANOVA testing indicated no significant effect for
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image inclusion (F(1/231) = 1.32, p = .25) or story valence (F(1/231) = 0.02, p = .90) on
global frequency estimates. Additionally, no significant interaction effects were revealed,
F(1/231) = 0.73, p = .40. Similar to local frequency estimates, participants’ global
frequency estimates were not significantly impacted by either of the independent
variables (see Table 2).
Research question 2b examined if image inclusion would impact participants’
global worry levels. ANOVA testing indicated no significant effect for image inclusion,
F(1/231) = 3.24, p = .07. Similarly, no significant effect was revealed for story valence
on global worry levels, F(1/231) = 0.13, p = .72. Finally, ANOVA testing revealed no
interaction effects on global worry levels, F(1/231) = 0.20, p = .66. As with all research
questions posed, neither of the independent variables significantly impacted participants’
global worry levels.
Because both local and global frequency estimates were skewed, estimates were
also broken into deciles to allow for non-parametric testing. Analysis using chi-square
testing revealed no significant effect for story valence (χ2(9) = 2.2, p = .99) or image
inclusion (χ2(9) = 8.4, p = .50) on participants’ global frequency estimates. Similarly, chisquare testing revealed no significant effect for story valence (χ2(9) = 4.3, p = .89) or
image inclusion (χ2(9) = 4.3, p = .47) on participants’ local frequency estimates.
Post-hoc Analysis
In order to examine the relationship between worry levels and frequency
estimates, correlation testing was run on participant responses for each individual risk.
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Table 3
Global Frequency Estimates
Story Valence

N

M

SD

54

27,807

48,332

62

44,441

69,095

116

36,698

60,650

Without Image

55

33,757

67,524

With
Image

64

35,878

63,436

Total

119

35,078

66,286

Positive
Without Image
With
Image
Total
Tragic

The results revealed significant positive correlations between worry levels and frequency
estimates for all but three of the risks presented—heart disease, lung cancer, and
homicide.
When comparing all four conditions, only the tragic narrative which included an
image revealed a significant correlation between local frequency estimates and worry
levels, rs = 0.29, n = 64, p = .02. When comparing tragic and positive narrative valence,
only the tragic stories revealed a significant correlation, rs = 0.23, n = 119, p = .01. When
comparing image inclusion and image exclusion, only those narratives which included an
image revealed a significant correlation between local frequency estimates and local
worry levels, rs = 0.24, n = 126, p = .01.
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Table 4
Correlations between frequency estimates and worry levels
Risk
Floods

rs
.29

p
< .001**

Stomach Cancer

.16

.01*

Tornadoes

.24

< .001**

Heart Disease

.02

.75

Homicide

.01

.91

Nuclear Accidents

.31

< .001**

Terrorism

.35

< .001**

Leukemia

.15

.03*

Lightning Strikes

.30

< .001**

Lung Cancer

.06

.32

Accidental Falls

.15

.02*

Stroke

.14

.03*

Airplane Accidents

.26

< .001**

Electrocution

.18

< .01**

War

.42

< .001**

Toxic Chemical Spills

.39

< .001**

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Chapter Five: Discussion
Although this study revealed no statistically significant findings with regard to the
hypotheses and research questions, there are inferences that can potentially be drawn
from these results. Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that participants exposed to a tragic
narrative would report higher global worry levels and frequency estimates, respectively,
than those exposed to a positively valenced narrative. Neither hypothesis was supported
by this study’s findings. The research questions addressed the potential for an image
placed alongside a narrative to influence local and global worry levels and frequency
estimates. The results indicated that participant responses were not influenced by the
presence of an image. In short, the results of this study suggest that neither the valence of
a narrative nor the presence of an accompanying image has an impact on readers’
judgments of a wide variety of lethal risks.
This section will highlight a few factors that may have played a part in producing
the results of this study—generational shifts in how mediated messages are processed, the
difficulty of making risk estimates, and finally, the potential overstatement of how affect
impacts judgments of risk. Additionally, the relationship between worry levels and risk
estimates will be addressed, with special attention paid to the influence of perceived
control of risk.
The Trouble with Risk Estimates
One surprising result of this study’s findings is the wide range of responses with
regard to frequency estimates. Because global estimates were calculations of the overall
mean for twelve risks, it is perhaps reasonable that the range estimates was so large.
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However, analysis of local frequency estimates (mean estimates for a single risk—fire)
also revealed a sizable range of responses.
Though surprising, the vast range of responses observed in this study does support
previous research, which has noted the difficulty that many people have with making
predictive judgments of risk (Adelswärd, & Sachs, 1996; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer,
2001). Even when provided with an anchor—the number of annual traffic fatalities—
respondents’ frequency estimates varied wildly. These results make those found by
Johnson and Tversky (1983) all the more surprising. Observing statistical significance in
a set of responses so shockingly erratic was unexpected.
Generational Shifts
Because Johnson and Tversky’s (1983) original study was conducted 35 years
ago, participants now may have a greater familiarity with mediated narratives of tragedy
than they did then in the early 1980s. One might assume that the average media consumer
is now more desensitized to emotional narrative or images than they once were. This,
however, does not account for the results which indicated the valance of the narrative did
influence participants’ responses to the 10-point mood scale, which served as the
manipulation check. The wording of the manipulation check may account for how
participants responded—“How would you feel if you had read this story in your local
newspaper or saw it on Facebook?” The word “would” may have prompted participants
to report not how they did feel after exposure to the stimulus but how they imagine they
would feel.
The Influence of Affect

37

One factor that may supersede a person’s particular affective state is their general
emotional disposition. If a particular respondent is of a generally optimistic disposition,
for example, the impact of their affective response to a tragic narrative may be blunted.
Butler and Matthews (1983) found that both anxious and depressed individuals
overestimated risk when compared with matched control subjects (p. 58). Others studies
have found that valence may be too broad to be considered the causal agent in how
people estimate risk. For example, Lerner and Keltner (2000) found that inducing two
emotions that can both be described as negative—fear and anger—produced different
results from one another. Fearful individuals reported significantly higher risk
assessments than did angry individuals (p. 484). Lerner and Keltner (2000) attributed this
finding to each emotion’s relationship to certainty and control. Angry participants, they
found, perceived greater certainty and control over their environment and fearful
participants perceived less of each (p. 485). If fear and anger are better predictors of how
emotion influences judgments of risk, then simply measuring positive or negative affect
may be insufficient.
Risk and Judgments of Control
Varying the control that participants’ might have over the events described in this
study’s stimuli may be particularly fruitful in investigating the role that control has in
how we judge risk. The narratives presented, regardless of condition, implied a lack of
control over the outcomes described. The positively valenced narratives described
someone who was struck by good fortune—winning a prize from a random drawing. The
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tragically valenced narratives described someone who was struck by bad fortune—
trapped by a rapidly-approaching wildfire.
The simplest inference that one could draw from these results is that affective
states are not sufficient to significantly alter people’s risk frequency estimates and worry
levels. That assertion, however, implies flawed or unsatisfactory conclusions suggested
by much of the research on this subject. No single study is sufficient to rebut decades of
research. This study, however, does potentially offer some additional insight into the
relative influence of affective states on judgments of risk.
Post hoc analysis demonstrated one particular result that warrants examination.
While participants’ estimates were quite erratic, their worry levels tended to correlate
with their estimates for each risk. There were, however, three exceptions. Worry levels
and frequency estimates were not correlated with regard to lung cancer, heart disease, and
homicide. These risks are particularly noteworthy as they are each related to control.
One factor that was not explicitly measured in this study is that of an individual’s
ability to control a given risk. Many of the risks that participants were asked to rate were
disasters or accidents that could easily be judged as uncontrollable. However, lung
cancer, heart disease, and homicide may have been perceived as controllable, which
could account for these non-correlated results. For example, a participant might recognize
the high rate of lung cancer in America but the participant is a non-smoker. This might
lead to a high estimate and a low worry level. Participants may understand lung cancer to
be a disease that is best attributed to lifestyle choices (Riles, Sangalang, Hurley, &
Tewksbury, 2015). The same can be said for heart disease—it is a health issue that
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primarily affects the middle-aged and older and is also perceived to be controllable
through diet and exercise. Finally, homicide is a lethal risk that is certainly sensational
and therefore receives much attention from news sources. That, however, does not
necessarily translate into high levels of worry for participants. They may very well think
that the homicide rate is high but only in certain cities or communities. “It is dangerous in
those places,” they might think, “but not here.” In this case their perceived control is
geographically based, whereas judgments of the other two risks were based primarily on
lifestyle.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This study was not without its limitations. First, the participant pool for the study
was drawn from Mechanical Turk, whose worker pool tends to skew younger, slightly
better educated, and more likely Caucasian than the general population of the United
States (Sheehan, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, the demographic composition in this study
potentially suffers from the “white male effect”, which suggests that white males feel less
vulnerable to risk and they therefore underestimate risk in general (Finucane, Slovic,
Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000). A truly generalized U.S. population may be more
revealing in terms of how we make judgments of risk. Second, this study did not include
participants’ personal experience with any of the risks. If one is to examine both the
availability and affect heuristics, factoring in personal experience would better illuminate
the results. After all, availability and affect are largely dependent upon the “imprint” that
an event or class of events has in the mind of a given participant. Exposing a participant
to a narrative describing a tragic incident might well elicit different responses from those
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who have personal experience with a similar tragedy than with one who has not.
Additionally, future research into this subject might get better results if the accuracy of
participants’ frequency estimates are somehow incentivized. The massive range of
estimates could potentially be attenuated if participants were truly trying to estimate
correctly. If the same range of responses were found, even with the inclusion of accuracy
incentives, the results from this study could be more solidly supported as truly reflective
of participants’ best-faith efforts. Such an experiment could be run in a laboratory setting
to ensure that participants are not tempted to retrieve the actual numbers from other
sources.
Finally, the current media landscape is heavily video-based and researchers would
be wise to integrate video elements into their experimental designs. A still photo of, in
this case, a house on fire may not sufficiently elicit a strong emotional reaction. Updating
the stimuli to fit the current media environment would be a well-advised strategy for
arriving at results with greater external validity.
Conclusion
The manner by which humans make judgments about risk is still somewhat
murky. Research has indicated that cognitive heuristics certainly play a central role,
although to what extent and to what effect is not entirely clear. Johnson and Tversky’s
(1983) study found that a person’s affect toward a specific risk influences not only their
judgment of that risk but a wide variety of separate, unrelated risks. This study found that
valence had no effect on such judgments.
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Additionally, the inclusion of an image in messages regarding lethal risk had no
effect on how participants judged risk in general. Although it seems to make logical sense
that providing a tragic image would effectively activate both the affect and availability
heuristics, this study showed no evidence of such activation. Regardless of the valence of
the narrative presented, inclusion of an accompanying image did not influence
participants’ worry or frequency estimates either locally or globally.
There is a substantial body of literature that suggests both availability and affect
are significant factors in how we judge risk, although positive and negative affect are
both broad classifications of one’s emotional state. In the same regard, a person’s sense
of control or certainty likely plays a part in how on assesses risk. Accounting for each
variable in making such determinations is clearly a challenge. A greater understanding of
how we process risk, though, is of real importance. An individual, a group, or even a
society that badly misjudges risk is prone to over or undercompensate when they try to
address a given risk. If we, collectively, have a more well-calibrated understanding of the
risks to which we are exposed, we may then be more likely to take reasonable steps to
mitigate pervasive risks, and perhaps less likely to overinflate our concern about
sensationalized, yet uncommon risks.

42

References
Adelswärd, V., & Sachs, L. (1996). The meaning of 6.8: numeracy and normality in
health information talks. Social Science & Medicine, 43(8), 1179-1187.
Arrow, K. J. (1982). Risk perception in psychology and economics. Economic Inquiry,
20(1), 1–9.
Baron, J., Hershey, J. C., & Kunreuther, H. (2000). Determinants of priority for risk
reduction: the role of worry. Risk Analysis, 20(4), 413-428.
Black, W. C., Nease Jr, R. F., & Tosteson, A. N. (1995). Perceptions of breast cancer risk
and screening effectiveness in women younger than 50 years of age. JNCI:
Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 87(10), 720-731.
Borkovec, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stober, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive phenomenon
intimately linked to affective, physiological, and interpersonal behavioral
processes. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22(6), 561-576.
Bungalow House Plans. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://thebungalowcompany.com/
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1983). Cognitive processes in anxiety. Advances in behaviour
research and therapy, 5(1), 51-62.
Coleman, C.-L. (1993). The influence of mass media and interpersonal communication
on societal and personal risk judgments. Communication Research, 20(4), 611–
628.
Dunwoody, S., & Neuwirth, K. (1991). Coming to terms with the impact of
communication on scientific and technological risk judgments. Risky business:
Communicating issues of science, risk, and public policy, 11-30.

43

Eastman, J. (2017, December 27). Beaverton retiree wins HGTV’s remodeled bungalow
(before, after photos). Retrieved from
https://www.oregonlive.com/hg/index.ssf/2017/12/hgtv_bungalow_oregon_winne
r.html
Edell, J. A., & Burke, M. C. (1987). The power of feelings in understanding advertising
effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 14(3), 421–433.
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic
in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(1),
1.
Finucane, M. L., Slovic, P., Mertz, C. K., Flynn, J., & Satterfield, T. A. (2000). Gender,
race, and perceived risk: The'white male'effect. Health, risk & society, 2(2), 159172.
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2015). When do ratings implicate perception versus
judgment? The “overgeneralization test” for top-down effects. Visual Cognition,
23(9-10), 1217-1226.
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Read, S., & Combs, B. (1978). How safe is safe
enough? A psychometric study of attitudes towards technological risks and
benefits. Policy Sciences, 9(2), 127–152.
Fishburn, P. C. (1970). Utility theory for decision making. Research Analysis Corp
Mclean, VA.
Folkes, V. S. (1988). The availability heuristic and perceived risk. Journal of Consumer
Research, 15(1), 13–23.

44

Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Why do
people worry?. Personality and individual differences, 17(6), 791-802.
Gramlich, J. (2016, November 16). Voters’ perceptions of crime continue to conflict with
reality. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/16/voters-perceptions-ofcrime-continue-to-conflict-with-reality/
Harrington, N. G., & Kerr, A. M. (2017). Rethinking risk: Prospect theory application in
health message framing research. Health Communication, 32(2), 131–141.
Highway Deaths Lead National Increase in Transportation Fatalities. (n.d.). Retrieved
from https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20171121.aspx
Houts, P. S., Doak, C. C., Doak, L. G., & Loscalzo, M. J. (2006). The role of pictures in
improving health communication: a review of research on attention,
comprehension, recall, and adherence. Patient Education and Counseling, 61(2),
173–190.
Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(1), 20.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss and
Giroux.
Keller, C., Siegrist, M., & Gutscher, H. (2006). The role of the affect and availability
heuristics in risk communication. Risk Analysis, 26(3), 631–639.
Keselman, H. J., Algina, J., Lix, L. M., Wilcox, R. R., & Deering, K. N. (2008). A
generally robust approach for testing hypotheses and setting confidence intervals

45

for effect sizes. Psychological Methods, 13(2), 110–129. doi:10.1037/1082989X.13.2.110
Kim, D. J., Ferrin, D. L., & Rao, H. R. (2008). A trust-based consumer decision-making
model in electronic commerce: The role of trust, perceived risk, and their
antecedents. Decision Support Systems, 44(2), 544–564.
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific
influences on judgement and choice. Cognition & emotion, 14(4), 473-493.
Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M., & Combs, B. (1978). Judged
frequency of lethal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning
and Memory, 4(6), 551.
Lipkus, I. M., Samsa, G., & Rimer, B. K. (2001). General performance on a numeracy
scale among highly educated samples. Medical decision making, 21(1), 37-44.
Lopes, L. L. (1987). Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 255–295.
Lu, H.-P., Hsu, C.-L., & Hsu, H.-Y. (2005). An empirical study of the effect of perceived
risk upon intention to use online applications. Information Management &
Computer Security, 13(2), 106–120.
MacInnis, D. J., & Price, L. L. (1987). The role of imagery in information processing:
Review and extensions. Journal of Consumer Research, 13(4), 473–491.
Massumi, B. (1995). The autonomy of affect. Cultural critique, (31), 83-109.

46

Mitchell, A. A., & Olson, J. C. (1981). Are product attribute beliefs the only mediator of
advertising effects on brand attitude? Journal of Marketing Research, 18(3), 318–
332.
Mongin, P. (1997). Expected utility theory. Handbook of Economic Methodology,
342350.
Moser, D. V. (1989). The effects of output interference, availability, and accounting
information on investors’ predictive judgments. Accounting Review, 433–448.
Mossin, J. (1968). Taxation and risk-taking: an expected utility approach. Economica,
35(137), 74–82.
O’keefe, D. J. (2002). Persuasion: Theory and research (Vol. 2). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Palenchar, M. J., & Heath, R. L. (2007). Strategic risk communication: Adding value to
society. Public Relations Review, 33(2), 120–129.
Pelham, B. W. (2012). Intermediate statistics: A conceptual course. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Peters, E. (2012). Beyond comprehension: The role of numeracy in judgments and
decisions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(1), 31-35.
Peters, E., Slovic, P., Västfjäll, D., & Mertz, C. K. (2008). Intuitive numbers guide
decisions. Judgment and Decision Making, 3(8), 619-635.
Pratt, J. W. (1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, 122–136.

47

Riles, J. M., Sangalang, A., Hurley, R. J., & Tewksbury, D. (2015). Framing cancer for
online news: Implications for popular perceptions of cancer. Journal of
Communication, 65(6), 1018-1040.
Rottenstreich, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2001). Money, kisses, and electric shocks: On the
affective psychology of risk. Psychological Science, 12(3), 185–190.
Sattath, S., & Tversky, A. (1977). Additive similarity trees. Psychometrika, 42(3), 319–
345.
Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A.
(1991). Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(2), 195.
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2007). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. In A.
Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology. Handbook of basic
principles (2nd ed.; pp. 385-407). New York: Guilford.
Scott, L. M. (1994). Images in advertising: The need for a theory of visual rhetoric.
Journal of Consumer Research, 21(2), 252–273.
Sheehan, K. B. (2018). Crowdsourcing research: Data collection with Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. Communication Monographs, 85(1), 140-156.
Sherman, S. J., Cialdini, R. B., Schwartzman, D. F., & Reynolds, K. D. (1985).
Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease:
The mediating effect of ease of imagery. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 11(1), 118–127.

48

Simon, H. A. (1992). What is an “Explanation” of Behavior? Psychological Science,
3(3), 150–161. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00017.x
Slovic, P. (1993). Perceived risk, trust, and democracy. Risk Analysis, 13(6), 675–682.
Slovic, P. (2016). The perception of risk. London: Routledge.
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk as analysis and
risk as feelings: Some thoughts about affect, reason, risk, and rationality. Risk
Analysis, 24(2), 311–322.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1980). Facts and fears: Understanding
perceived risk. Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe Is Safe Enough, 4, 181–214.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1981). Facts and fears: societal perception of
risk. ACR North American Advances.
Slovic, P., & Peters, E. (2006). Risk perception and affect. Current directions in
psychological science, 15(6), 322-325.
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M. L., & MacGregor, D. G. (2005). Affect, risk, and
decision making. Health Psychology, 24(4S), S35.
Starr, C. (1969). Social benefit versus technological risk. Science, 1232–1238.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207–232.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases
(pp. 141–162). Springer.
Warburg, Z. (2018, January 5). 3 Lawsuits Blame Southern California Edison for Thomas
Fire. Retrieved from

49

https://www.noozhawk.com/article/3_lawsuits_blame_southern_california_edison
_for_thomas_fire
Wray, R. J., Kreuter, M. W., Jacobsen, H., Clements, B., & Evans, R. G. (2004).
Theoretical perspectives on public communication preparedness for terrorist
attacks. Family & Community Health, 27(3), 232–241.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American
Psychologist, 35(2), 151–175. doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151

50

Appendix A – Experimental Stimuli
All conditions begin with the following statement:
“A popular trend in journalism has been the inclusion of personal interest and feature
stories. Please carefully read the short newspaper article on the following page and
answer the questions that follow.”
Positive Condition
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Positive Condition with Image
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Tragic Condition
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Tragic Condition with Image
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Appendix B – Survey Instrument
Q7 On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate the article you have just read according to the
elements listed below.
1 (Low)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
(High)

Clarity

o

o o o o o o o o o

Interest

o

o o o o o o o o o

Style

o

o o o o o o o o o

Informativeness

o

o o o o o o o o o

Objectivity

o

o o o o o o o o o

Overall Quality

o

o o o o o o o o o

Q8 How would you feel if you had read this story in your local newspaper or saw it on
Facebook?
Negative,
depressed
1

o

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Positive,
uplifted
10

o o o o o o o o o
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Q13 Please estimate the number of people in the United States that die each year from the
following causes. For your reference, traffic accidents accounted for about 37,000 deaths
in the U.S. in 2017.

o Leukemia _________________________________________
o Floods ____________________________________________
o Stomach Cancer ____________________________________
o Tornadoes _________________________________________
o Heart Disease ______________________________________
o Homicide _________________________________________
o Nuclear Accidents __________________________________
o Terrorism _________________________________________
o Lightning Strikes ___________________________________
o Lung Cancer _______________________________________
o Accidental Falls ____________________________________
o Stroke ____________________________________________
o Airplane Accidents __________________________________
o Electrocution ______________________________________
o Fire ______________________________________________
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o War ______________________________________________
o Toxic Chemical Spills ________________________________
Q14 For each potential hazard listed below, please indicate your general
level of worry on a scale from 1 (Not worried at all) to 10 (Extremely
worried).
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Floods

o o o o o o o o o o

Stomach
Cancer

o o o o o o o o o o

Tornadoes

o o o o o o o o o o

Heart
Disease

o o o o o o o o o o

Traffic
Accidents

o o o o o o o o o o

Homicide

o o o o o o o o o o

Nuclear
Accidents

o o o o o o o o o o

Terrorism

o o o o o o o o o o

Leukemia

o o o o o o o o o o
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Lightning
Strikes

o o o o o o o o o o

Lung Cancer

o o o o o o o o o o

Accidental
Falls

o o o o o o o o o o

Stroke

o o o o o o o o o o

Airplane
Accidents

o o o o o o o o o o

Electrocution

o o o o o o o o o o

Fire

o o o o o o o o o o

War

o o o o o o o o o o

Toxic
Chemical
Spills

o o o o o o o o o o
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Q12 Please estimate the number of people per year in the United States who won the
following prizes in 2017.

o Lottery jackpot over one million dollars_____________________________
o Lottery jackpot over ten million dollars _________________________
o A new home ____________________________________
o A timeshare_____________________________________
o An iPad_____________________________________

59

Q10 Have you ever won anything by random chance (for example, a raffle prize or
money from a lottery ticket)?
Yes

o
Q15 You would describe your ethnicity as: (select all that apply)
White/Caucasian
Hispanic or Latino
Black or African American
Native American or American Indian
Asian / Pacific Islander
Other
Prefer not to answer

No

o
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Q16 Please select your gender.

o Male
o Female
o Non-gendered
o Prefer not to answer
Q17 In what year were you born? _________________

Q18 Is there anything else you would like to share with us about the survey?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C – Informed Consent Form
Q1 Informed Consent Form
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Derek Bonniksen under
the direction of Dr. Lauren Frank. This study attempts to collect information about
stylistic features of news reporting. You were selected as a possible participant in this
study because you are at least 18 years old and have a positive rating on Mechanical
Turk.
Procedures
If you decide to participate, you will be asked read a short newspaper article and answer
questions about your reaction to it. You will then be asked to complete a questionnaire
about your response to the story. The entire study will take approximately 20
minutes.
Risks/Discomforts
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel uncomfortable
when asked to read a personal interest story. You are welcome to skip any question that
you feel uncomfortable answering.
Benefits
You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study. However, it is
hoped that through your participation, the study may help to increase knowledge which
may help others in the future.
Confidentiality
All information that is obtained in connection with this study will be kept confidential
and will only be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and
never reporting individual ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other
than the research team will have access to them. At no point will you name be linked to
your answers.
Compensation
For completing this study you will receive $1.25 as compensation to your Mechanical
Turk account.
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Participation
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to
withdraw at any time or refuse to participate entirely.
Questions about the Research
If you have questions or concerns regarding this study, contact Derek Bonniksen
(dbonn2@pdx.edu) or Dr. Frank at LFrank@pdx.edu.
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, please Research
and Strategic Partnerships, Market Center Building 6th floor, Portland State University,
503-725-4288. By completing this survey, you are certifying that you are 18 years of age
or older, that you have read and understood the above information and agree to take part
in the survey. To print this consent form on a PC, press CTRL + P. To print this consent
form on a Mac, press COMMAND + P. If at this point you choose to continue in this
research study, please click "I consent" to continue.

o

I consent

o

I do NOT consent

